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BENJAMIN K.  SOVACOOL AND VLADO VIVODA
A Comparison of Chinese, Indian, and Japanese  
Perceptions of Energy Security
ABSTRACT
This study explores how Asian energy security issues are perceived in China, India, 
and Japan. It investigates perceptions of 16 energy security challenges drawn from 
an extensive survey, as well as how such conceptions differ between Asian energy 
consumers and across these dimensions of energy security.
KEYWORDS:  energy security, perceptions, China, India, Japan
INTRODUCTION
China, India, and Japan—the three largest economies in Asia—face some 
daunting energy security challenges. Regionally, projected growth in energy 
consumption, both in terms of per capita use and total use in aggregate, is 
expected to rise dramatically for Asian countries in the next few decades.1 
As a whole, Asia-Paci+c’s per capita electricity demand was only about 1,300 
kilowatt hours (kWh) in 2005, compared to the world average of more than 
2,500 kWh. In Asia-Paci+c, between 2005 and 2030:
t Energy demand is expected to grow at 2.4%, whereas the world average 
during the same period will be 1.5%;
t Net imports of fossil fuels are expected to more than double; 
1. International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook (Paris: OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] / IEA, 2010).
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t 9e region’s oil dependency will increase from 57.5% to 66.4%; 
t 9e region will need between $7 trillion and $9.7 trillion (in constant 
2006 dollars) of cumulative investment in the energy sector during this 
period, of which 60% will be in electricity generation, transmission, and 
distribution.2 
More speci+cally, security of supply has become a key economic and political 
concern for China, which had to ration natural gas and oil supplies in 2010 
because of unexpected delays in imports. In 2008, India abandoned a deal 
to build an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline—over which discussions were 
conducted for more than 13 years—citing security issues and Pakistan’s un-
willingness to penalize supply disruptions. Japan buys nearly 90% of its oil 
from the Middle East, making it vulnerable to disruptions of even a few days 
in the Strait of Hormuz or in shipping routes from the Middle East.3
Furthermore, rising demand for fossil fuels from China and India is already 
having a profound impact on the energy world. It is behind the recent global 
resurgence in resource nationalism.4 Such demand is also a factor in higher 
energy prices and in the changing patterns of greenhouse gas emissions, energy 
trade, and energy geopolitics. India’s and China’s growing energy intake and 
the resulting regional competition for increasingly scarce energy sources have 
signi+cant security, environmental, economic, and political implications for 
the region and the world. For example, the region’s dwindling reserves of oil 
and gas are insu8cient to satisfy growing demand. China, Japan, and India 
account for 19.3% of the world’s oil demand yet control only 1.5% of the 
world’s oil reserves.5 
In addition to being international and external, energy security threats may 
be domestic and internal. Laborers of India’s public sector petroleum com-
pany Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Limited (ONGC) went on a three 
day strike in early 2009, shutting down the Hazira plant that processes oil and 
gas from o<shore operations and causing shortages of compressed natural gas 
2. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Energy Outlook for Asia and the Paci!c (Manila: ADB, 2009).
3. See Malavika J. Bambawale and Benjamin K. Sovacool, “China’s Energy Security: 9e Perspec-
tive of Energy Users,” Applied Energy 88:5 (May 2011), pp. 1949–56; and Benjamin K. Sovacool, ed., 
Routledge Handbook of Energy Security (London: Routledge, 2011).
4. Vlado Vivoda, “Resource Nationalism, Bargaining, and International Oil Companies: Chal-
lenges and Change in the New Millennium,” New Political Economy 14:4 (December 2009), pp. 
517–34.
5. British Petroleum (BP), BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011 (London:BP, 2011).
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used for public transportation. Large parts of China had to confront energy 
shortages in 2010 because of a combination of weather and infrastructure 
factors: di8culty of transporting coal in the snow, less hydropower output 
amid freezing temperatures, and reduced coal supplies from Shanxi Province 
stemming from mine closures. Japanese planners had to shut down about 
one-+fth of the country’s nuclear power plant capacity in 2009 after a series 
of earthquakes cracked reactor vessels and cooling towers, to say nothing of 
the impact of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011. 
9ese examples illustrate the interconnected nature of energy security 
concerns, showing how they cross scales (international and domestic) and 
sectors (electricity, transport, and extractive industries). How are these issues 
perceived by energy users in China, India, and Japan? What explains di<er-
ences in perceptions, if any, both within and between these countries? 9is 
study answers these questions by exploring how a sample of government, 
industry, civil society, and academic energy users from the three Asian coun-
tries perceive energy security threats and dimensions. Its primary source of 
data is a four-part survey distributed in three languages (English, Chinese, 
and Japanese) to 830 respondents in China, India, and Japan. We +nd that 
traditional notions of “energy security” have their limits and do not capture 
the complexities of how Indian, Chinese, and Japanese respondents view 
energy security challenges. Rather than conceiving of energy security only in 
terms of security over access to fuel, our survey advances a broader notion of 
energy security encompassing technology, fuels, trade, behavior, institutions, 
the environment, and education. 9e +ndings of our survey, in which 16 
dimensions of energy security were perceived as being at least “somewhat im-
portant,” advance the need for policy makers and scholars to utilize a broader 
conceptualization of energy security encompassing technology, fuels, trade, 
behavior, institutions, the environment, and education. 
We acknowledge that there are major di<erences in these countries’ 
energy pro+les in terms of level of development, resource endowment, and 
access to energy fuels. On the one hand, Japan is a developed country with 
universal access to electricity, high levels of automobile ownership, and a 
notoriously poor endowment of fossil fuels. On the other hand, China and 
India are developing countries with low but growing access to electricity 
and automobile ownership yet with relatively large fossil fuel resource en-
dowments. 9ese three countries were selected because they are the largest 
energy consumers in Asia, meaning that the energy security challenges 
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they face will likely be more severe than those faced by other countries that 
consume less. In addition, the three countries are crucial cases for analyzing 
the potential for increased regional energy cooperation and for strengthen-
ing the regional energy governance architecture. Consequently, the survey 
results are signi+cant for understanding energy security concerns within 
and among these three countries, as well as for anticipating future energy 
policy direction, both domestically and regionally.
RESEARCH METHODS 
China, India, and Japan, along with other Asian countries, face some inter-
related energy policy and technology challenges. Although not an exhaustive 
list, these include: (1) imbalances between regional supplies of energy fuels and 
booming demand for energy services; (2) urbanization and population growth; 
(3) large amounts of energy poverty, de+ned as lack of access to electricity and 
dependence on solid fuels for household energy needs and inequitable access 
to those electricity networks that do exist; (4) potentially devastating impacts 
from climate change on communities with little resilience to cope with them; 
(5) shortages of water needed for thermoelectric power stations; (6) increased 
vulnerability to volatile oil prices; (7) massive subsidies for fossil fuels that 
distort energy markets; and (8) the ever-present risk of nuclear weapons pro-
liferation and accidents connected to atomic energy.6 Because scant data on 
perceptions of these energy security risks within our three countries existed in 
the peer-reviewed literature, we began by designing and testing a survey that 
asked respondents to rank the following 16 dimensions of energy security:
t Securing a supply of fossil fuels and uranium;
t Bolstering trade in energy fuels and commodities;
6. See Asia Paci+c Energy Research Center (APERC), Energy Security Initiative: Some  Aspects 
of Oil Security (Tokyo: APERC / Institute for Energy Economics, 2003); Vijay Modi, Susan 
 McDade, Dominique Lallement, and Jamal Saghir, Energy Services for the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (Geneva: United Nations Development Program [UNDP], World Bank, and Energy 
Sector  Management  Assistance Program, 2005); World Economic Forum, %e New Energy Secu-
rity  Paradigm (Davos: World Economic Forum / Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 2006); 
United  Nations  Environment Program, Freshwater Under %reat: South Asia Vulnerability Assess-
ment ( Geneva: UN, 2008); Eshita Gupta, “Oil Vulnerability Index of Oil-importing Countries,” 
Energy Policy 36:3 (March 2008), pp. 1195–1211; Alexander E. Farrell, Hisham Zerri8, and Hadi 
Dowlatabadi, “Energy Infrastructure and Security,” Annual Review of Environment and Resources 
29:1 (November 2004), pp. 421–69.
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t Minimizing depletion of domestically available fuels;
t Providing predictable and clear price signals; 
t Enabling a<ordably priced energy services;
t Providing equitable access to energy services;
t Decentralizing away from large-scale, conventional, centralized sources of 
energy to those distributed and smaller in scale; 
t Lowering energy intensity (energy use per unit of gross domestic product 
[GDP]);
t Researching and developing (R&D) new energy technologies; 
t Ensuring transparency and participation in project siting and decision- 
making;
t O<ering energy education and information; 
t Preserving land and forests;
t Enhancing the availability and quality of water;
t Minimizing air pollution;
t Responding to climate change / adaptation;
t Reducing greenhouse gas emissions / mitigation.
9ese dimensions of energy security were distilled from a meta-survey of 90 
peer-reviewed articles7 and were formulated into survey questions tested with 
two focus groups consisting of 15 experts. 
We relied on a targeted survey, rather than a simple review of policy statements 
or simulations of energy market behavior, for multiple reasons. First, we wanted 
the views from actual energy consumers, those who use energy at the work place 
and in the home, rather than the more abstract perceptions of politicians or aca-
demics. No such data existed, so a survey was designed to collect it. 
Second, we chose a survey because it is the most appropriate research tool 
for testing speci+c hypotheses quickly, with research results relatively inde-
pendent of the researcher’s own preconceptions, over a large population.8 
7. For a discussion of these articles in greater detail, see Benjamin K. Sovacool and Marilyn A. 
Brown, “Competing Dimensions of Energy Security: An International Review,” Annual Review of 
Environment and Resources 35:1 (November 2010), pp. 77–108.
8. See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scienti!c 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); Alexander L. 
George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and %eory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); and Johnson R. Burke and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie, 
“Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come,” Educational Researcher 
33:7 (October 2004), pp. 14–26.
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Surveys such as ours are useful for studying the perceptions of large numbers 
of people and are less time consuming than telephone polls or research inter-
views. Data collection and transcription are also easier, with entries automati-
cally logged in a computer +le rather than having to be translated and coded. 
9ird, we relied on a targeted, purposive sampling strategy, which means 
that respondents were chosen to represent four di<erent types of perspectives: 
academia, the private sector, government, and civil society.9 Targeted surveys 
o<er a rich, cost-e<ective vehicle for generating unique data to investigate 
national policy and politics while generating highly reliable and valid data.10 
However, we must also note that since our sample included 73% of respon-
dents with at least an undergraduate degree as well as an array of government 
o8cials, businesspersons, employees of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), and university employees, this selection represents particular per-
ceptions of energy security; our results cannot be generalized to entire popu-
lations. As Table 1 and Figure 1 reveal, some other biases exist within the 
sample as well. Surveys were more di8cult to distribute in India, meaning 
Indian responses account for less than one-quarter of respondents, whereas 
respondents from Japan represented almost half of the sample. Almost half 
of the respondents in our sample worked for the private sector, and more 
than 60% were aged 18 to 35. All of these characteristics are proportionately 
higher than what an unbiased sample would represent. Our survey also pos-
sibly su<ers from self-selection bias,11 that is, only those who already deem 
energy security to be important (or those unhappy with energy security in 
their country) would conceivably take the time to complete it. 
Our structured questionnaire consisted mainly of multiple choice ques-
tions. As Table 1 reveals, the survey was made available online to respondents 
across all three countries through a survey hosting website. An additional 
400 surveys were distributed by hand through colleagues in Delhi, India; 
Beijing and Shanghai, China; and Tokyo, Japan, respectively. Of these 400 
9. Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, Naturalistic Inquiry (London: Sage Publications, 1985).
10. Glenn Beamer, “Elite Interviews and State Politics Research,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 2:1 
(Spring 2002), pp. 86–96. See also Lewis A. Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, Ill.: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970); David Richards, “Elite Interviewing: Approaches and Pitfalls,” 
Politics 16:3 (September 1996), pp. 199–204; and John Scott, “Modes of Power and the Re-conceptual-
ization of Elites,” Sociological Review 56:1 (May 2008), pp. 25–43; Michael Woods, “Rethinking Elites: 
Networks, Space, and Local Politics,” Environment and Planning A 30:12 (December 1998), pp. 2101–19.
11. 9omas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-Experimentation: Design & Analysis Issues 
for Field Settings (Boston: Houghton Mi=in Co., 1979).
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table 1. Summary of Energy Security Survey Distribution
Country Language(s) Distribution Respondents % Total
Japan English and Japanese Electronic (online) and print 346 41.7
China English and Chinese Electronic (online) and print 312 37.6
India English Electronic (online) and print 172 20.7
 Total 830 100
source: By authors.
Gender
Education
Male
55%
Undergraduate 
38%
Other 
11%
Postgraduate
35%
Secondary
16%
Female
45%
55 and above
46 to 55
26 to 35
36 to 45
18 to 25
8.19%
12.41%
  17.83%
30.72%
30.84%
Age
45.62%
29.64%
17.01%
5.28%
2.45%
Private sector
University
Government
Nonprofit
Intergovernmental
Occupation
figure 1. Demographic Characteristics of Our Energy Security Survey Sample
source:  By authors.
note: Education and gender figures expressed in percentage, 100% = 830 respondents. 
“University” = those working at colleges, universities, schools, and academic institutions; 
“private sector” = working in electricity supply, transport, industry, business, and for-profit 
organizations; “government” = working for local, state, and national governments as well as 
national institutes and regulatory agencies; “nonprofit” = those working in civil society and 
NGOs; “intergovernmental” refers to organizations such as the World Bank or Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC).
printed surveys, 366 were completed between January and July 2010 and 464 
out of 466 online surveys were +nished over the same period, for a total of 
830 surveys completed and an overall response rate of 95.8%. 9is unusually 
high response rate may be attributed to repeated requests from the distribu-
tors of the printed survey urging respondents to complete it and the fact that 
almost all online respondents completed the survey after they started it. It is 
impossible to tell how many respondents never elected to complete the online 
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survey in the +rst place. Data on the characteristics on non-respondents were 
not collected. A copy of the survey in English is provided in Appendix 1.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the demographic characteristics of 
respondents, though we must note that (a) the sample size of the survey is not 
proportional to national population size, (b) the results have not been weighted 
to match national demographic pro+les, and (c) 32 respondents did not provide 
their country of residence when completing the survey online. Distribution 
of the survey was purposive, not random, and directed at ensuring a mix of 
respondents from di<erent sectors, so that a minimum of 30 respondents for 
each country came from academia, the private sector, government, or civil so-
ciety. 9ese included government o8cials, businesspersons, NGO employees, 
and university employees, none of whom were necessarily experts in the +eld 
of energy. 9ose who chose to respond did so only based on their willingness 
to participate; they were not compensated. To be eligible, a person needed 
only (a) consider one of our three countries their home and (b) consume and 
use energy there. 
9e survey consisted of four parts with 19 total questions. 9e +rst part col-
lected demographic information about respondents, including their country 
of residence, nationality, age, level of education, gender, occupation sector, 
name of employer, and job title. 9e second part asked participants to rate 16 
dimensions of energy security according to a +ve-point Likert scale:12
1. Extremely unimportant
2. Somewhat unimportant
3. Neither important nor unimportant
4. Somewhat important
5. Extremely important 
We call this method of questioning “rating.” 9e third part asked respon-
dents to choose the +ve most important dimensions of energy security 
from the list of 16 and rank them in order of importance from +rst to 
+fth. We call this method of questioning “ranking.” 9e +nal part was 
open-ended, asking respondents to add any energy security dimension 
that they thought was missing in the survey and instructing them to rate 
it on the Likert scale. 
12. Rensis Likert, “A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes,” Archives of Psychology 22:140 
(1932), pp. 1–55. 
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RESULTS
9e survey results for China, India, and Japan are presented in Table 2 
according to the average ratings for each energy security dimension. Table 2 
reveals that perceptions of energy security in China and India sway toward 
“traditional” energy security issues such as supply security. Perceptions in 
Japan increasingly emphasize the importance of dimensions that have recently 
become more salient (pollution, R&D, etc.), although the security of the fos-
sil fuel supply is still pertinent. Table 3, which shows the average rankings for 
each energy security dimension, all but con+rms this. In all three countries, 
respondents ranked the security of the fossil fuel supply as the +rst and sec-
ond most important issues across all dimensions. Notably, rated and ranked 
responses di<er within the sample, yet environmental concerns (such as water 
and air pollution) were listed high in both sets of ratings and rankings.
More speci+cally, for China, a secure supply of fossil fuels is rated most 
highly across all dimensions, followed by minimizing the destruction of land, 
water, and air. 9e lowest rated dimension is decentralized energy systems, fol-
lowed by promotion of trade in energy products, technologies, and exports. In 
terms of +rst and second most highly ranked dimensions, 48% of respondents 
ranked a secure supply of fossil fuels as +rst or second, and 33% pointed to 
minimization of depletion of domestically available energy fuels. Surprisingly, 
there was only a minimal di<erence in ratings in China across di<erent occupa-
tion groups. 9e government employees showed a di<erence in the pattern of 
responses, but unfortunately their sample size is too small to draw conclusive 
results. When asked an open-ended question on what dimensions may have 
been missed, there was a wide variety of responses. However, a common theme 
emerged around reduction of wastage and consumption, minimizing pressure 
on land and forests, improving energy e8ciency, and reducing emissions.
For Japan, the most highly rated dimension is minimizing air pollution, fol-
lowed by R&D. 9e lowest rated dimension is decentralized systems, followed 
by transparency in participation. In terms of +rst and second highest ranked 
dimensions, 44% ranked security of the fossil fuel supply as the +rst or second 
most important; 24% ranked greenhouse gas mitigation. Open-ended responses 
include several mentions of renewable energy, but a variety of ideas emerged 
including nuclear energy and cooperation and diplomacy among nations, along 
with educating the public and suppliers about energy-related issues. Occu-
pational di<erences exist—among university employees, low energy intensity 
emerged as the highest rated dimension, whereas among those in the private 
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sector and self-identi+ed housewives, it is merely average. 9e highest rated for 
these latter two groups is minimizing air pollution. Housewives are also the 
group giving the highest rating to climate-change adaptation and mitigation.
For India, the availability of water and a secure supply of fossil fuels were the 
two dimensions with the highest ratings, followed closely by R&D. As in China 
and Japan, the lowest rated dimension was decentralized systems. In terms of 
+rst and second most highly ranked dimensions, a secure supply of fossil fuels 
was also the most highly ranked dimension with 40% of responses, followed 
by R&D with 25%. 9ere were variations in the ratings across occupation cat-
egories in India. A secure supply of fossil fuels was not so important for those 
working in the non-pro+t or NGO sectors. For them, the degradation of land 
and availability of water were most important. For the private sector, participa-
tion in siting decisions was more important than for non-pro+t participants. 
R&D was most important for the private sector but did not rate among the top 
three for government workers. Open-ended responses about adding an energy 
security dimension varied considerably, across issues such as renewable energy, 
population control, public transportation, and rural availability.
DISCUSSION
Five key +ndings emerge from our study: 
t the cross-country di<erence in assigned importance to all 16 dimensions 
of energy security; 
t the overall importance of all energy security dimensions among respon-
dents in China, India, and Japan;
t the di<erence between perceptions assigned to the security of fossil fuels 
supply in di<erent countries and their actual reliance on imports;
t the importance assigned to pollution-related energy security dimensions 
in all the countries; 
t the relatively low importance assigned to the existence of small-scale, decen-
tralized energy system in all three countries. We discuss each of these in turn.
First, perceptions of the importance of all 16 dimensions of energy security 
are higher in India than in Japan, while China outperforms Japan in only four 
dimensions. What explains this phenomenon? One explanation could be that 
Japan is far more economically developed than either country, with higher levels 
of public education about energy-related issues. 9is might make the general 
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population more interested in emerging threats to energy security as opposed to 
traditional ones. China and India are developing countries that have only recently 
become large consumers and importers of energy. A signi+cant share of their 
populations, particularly in India, lacks access to electricity. 9us, perceptions of 
energy security lack the maturity that may come as new generations assume im-
portant roles in government, the private sector, higher education, and the media.
Second, with the exception of the low rating for the availability of small-scale, 
decentralized energy systems in China, all other ratings for the three countries 
are at a “somewhat important” or “extremely important” level. 9is indicates that 
all energy security dimensions are perceived as important in China, India, and 
Japan and shows that energy security is a salient issue area. Given such perceived 
importance, the level of politicization of various dimensions of energy security in 
the region is high. Tensions between China, India, and Japan exist across a num-
ber of dimensions, particularly with respect to the security of fossil fuel supply.
9ird, perceptions do not re:ect the reality of fossil fuel import depen-
dence in the three countries. Table 4 shows fossil fuel import dependence for 
China, India, and Japan. What is striking about this table is that Japan relies 
on imported fossil fuels far more than China and India—both in terms of 
share in overall demand and overall volumes. Indeed, Japan imports more 
fossil fuels by volume than China and India combined. Yet, perceptions do 
not re:ect this, and respondents in China and India rated the security of 
supplies as far more important than did respondents in Japan.
Why are respondents in Japan less concerned about the security of fossil 
fuel supply than those in China and India? Besides the general maturity level 
regarding energy security issues discussed above, there are three further plau-
sible explanations. 9e fact that China imports more oil than India and Japan 
provides a strong rationale for the Chinese to be anxious about the security 
of oil supplies. After all, oil is the most traded source of energy in the world, 
and the international oil market is highly imbalanced when compared to the 
natural gas and coal markets. Energy security concerns most often arise because 
of fears over the security of imported oil supplies and the transportation routes 
through which this oil passes. Moreover, China has only recently emerged as a 
large oil importer. In fact, the country was a net oil exporter until 1992 but is 
now the world’s second largest oil importer. Such rapid transformation and the 
continued demand for more imported oil (from often unstable regions) reach-
ing China via U.S.-dominated sea lines of communication (SLOCs) together 
explain why Chinese respondents may have ranked the security of supply as the 
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most important dimension. 9e same rationale also applies to India, although 
to a lesser extent. Finally, it is important to note that much of Japan’s oil imports 
also passes through U.S.-dominated SLOCs. However, Japan has a security 
alliance with the U.S. and is therefore less concerned about the security of its 
fossil fuel supplies than the Chinese and the Indians.13
Fourth, the three pollution-related energy security dimensions (minimiza-
tion of land, water, and air pollution) were among the top ranked by impor-
tance in all three countries. In fact, available and clean water was the top ranked 
dimension in India, and minimizing air pollution held the same spot in Japan. 
In China, the importance of the three pollution-related energy security dimen-
sions was ranked only behind the security of supplies. 9is +nding is signi+cant 
as it shows that respondents in the three countries are aware that they do not 
use energy in an environmentally responsible way. As a result, energy-related 
pollution is a fact of life. Rapidly increasing growth of fossil fuel use in the 
region is also already having a profound impact on global climate change, and 
public opinion in the three countries indicates that individuals are aware of this. 
Fifth, the importance of having small-scale, decentralized energy systems 
was the lowest ranked dimension in China, India, and Japan. 9e minor 
importance assigned to this dimension in all of the countries surveyed 
could stem from the fact that respondents may not have understood the 
exact meaning of this particular dimension, which relates to democratiz-
ing energy production at peoples’ homes and o8ces (through, say, solar 
panels or distributed generation) rather than at remote power plants and 
re+neries. In addition, the provision of energy services may be perceived 
to be the responsibility of central governments and too important to 
be decentralized. In e<ect, energy security is likely perceived as “high 
13. Vlado Vivoda and James Manicom, “Oil Import Diversi+cation in Northeast Asia: A Com-
parison Between China and Japan,” Journal of East Asian Studies 11:2 (May 2011), pp. 223–54.
table 4. Fossil Fuel Import Dependence (2010)
China India Japan
Oil 52.64% (225.6 mt) 74.98% (116.6 mt) 96.73% (195.0 mt)
Natural gas 11.21% (11.0 mtoe) 17.77% (9.9 mtoe) 94.71% (80.6 mtoe)
Coal –5.07% (–86.9 mtoe) 22.15% (61.5 mtoe) 99.60% (123.2 mtoe)
 Total 6.68% (149.7 mtoe) 38.46% (178.0 mtoe) 97.17% (398.8 mtoe)
source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2011 (London: BP, 2011).
note: mt = million tons; mtoe = million tons of oil equivalent. 
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politics” in all three countries, similar to border security, and thus some-
thing not to be delegated to local levels.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Several important policy implications stem from our +ndings. Given the 
perceptions of energy security in China, India, and Japan uncovered by our 
survey, clear dangers are emerging about future competition for supplies 
of fossil fuels and the problem of increasing land, water, and air pollution. 
Energy security has emerged as a critical issue in the broader Asia-Paci+c 
region. Many countries in the region, including China and India, are de-
veloping nations with rapid economic growth that is accompanied by an 
increasing demand for energy. 9e spectacular recent economic growth in the 
Asia-Paci+c region has spurred a vast expansion in the need for energy services 
and also in the demand for the fuels that help to supply these services. 9e 
rising consumption of energy in the Asia-Paci+c region, particularly in China, 
has major consequences for geopolitics, +nancial and energy markets, and 
pollution, both regionally and globally.14 Concern about adequate energy sup-
plies expressed in our survey, especially among these three major consumers, 
has the potential to transform power competition in the Asia-Paci+c region 
from its current bounded forms into open confrontation.
Consequently, our +ndings speak to the perception of the need, among 
our respondents at least, to strengthen the existing energy security governance 
infrastructure in the Asia-Paci+c region. It is in the region’s interest that energy 
competition is kept under control and that a cooperative, binding mechanism 
to tackle competition and growing energy-related pollution is established. 9e 
imperative for energy security in such a vulnerable strategic region as the Asia-
Paci+c is paramount for global stability and development. 9e priority of this 
challenge for the region is no accident: it is the world’s fastest growing energy 
consumer. What is worrying is the region’s absence of cooperation on energy se-
curity.15 Beyond the non-binding “2007 Cebu Declaration on Energy Security” 
14. Flynt Leverett and Je<rey Bader, “Managing China-U.S. Energy Competition in the Middle 
East,” Washington Quarterly 29:1 (Winter 2005–06), pp. 187–201.
15. See Jaewoo Choo, “Northeast Asia Energy Cooperation and the Role of China and Japan,” 
in Energy and Security Cooperation in Asia: Challenges and Prospects, eds. Christopher Len and Alvin 
Chew (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, 2009), pp. 41–60; and Vlado 
Vivoda, “Evaluating Energy Security in the Asia-Paci+c Region: A Novel Methodological Approach,” 
Energy Policy 38:9 (September 2010), pp. 5258–63.
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.24 on Thu, 12 Mar 2015 21:59:58 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
964   s  ASIAN SURVEY 52:5
as part of the East Asia Summit, and a number of bilateral agreements, there is 
an absence of regional commitments to enhance energy cooperation. 9erefore, 
it is imperative that the governments of China, India, and Japan all reevalu-
ate their respective energy policies and explore how regional energy security 
cooperation can be enhanced, in order to reduce their nations’ vulnerability to 
energy supply (or demand) disruptions and reduce energy-related pollution.
Given the cross-country discrepancy in the perceived importance of energy 
security dimensions, with the importance of all energy security dimensions 
perceived higher in India than in Japan, a public education campaign is needed 
not only in India but also in China. If the perceptions from our respondents 
are indicative of broader public views on energy security, the public deserves 
assurances that China and India need not be overly concerned with traditional 
energy security issues. 9is is particularly so given that Japan is more reliant 
(yet less concerned in terms of survey responses) on imported fossil fuels than 
either of the others. 9e public in China and India need to be educated about 
the bene+ts of regional energy security cooperation and assured that no im-
minent physical threats loom to the security of imported supplies of fossil fue.
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appendix 1. 9e Energy Security Survey
SECTION 1
1.  Please tell us about yourself:
a. Level of education:  Postgraduate  Undergraduate  Secondary  Other
b. Age:  18 to 25  26 to 35  36 to 45  46 to 55  55 and above 
c. Gender:  Male  Female
d. Country of residence:
 United States 
 Brazil
 Russia
 China
 India
 Kazakhstan 
 Papua New Guinea
 Saudi Arabia
 Singapore 
 Japan
 Germany
e. Nationality: __________________________________________________
f. Type of Occupation: 
 Private sector / industry / business / for-pro+t organization 
 Non pro+t, non-governmental organization / civil society 
 Government / national institute / regulatory agency
 University / school / academic institution 
 Intergovernmental organization 
g. Name of Primary Employer (optional): ______________________________
h. Job Title (optional): _____________________________________________
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SECTION 3
 3.  Given the 16 dimensions of energy security discussed here, select the +ve that you think 
are most important for your country of residence, and rank them from 1 (the most 
important) to 5 (5th most important), without allowing for ties. Please rank only +ve 
dimensions:
 
Secure supply of oil, gas, coal, and uranium
 
 
Bolstering trade
 
Minimizing rates of depletion
 
Predictable and clear price signals 
 
A<ordably priced energy services
 
Decentralization and small-scale supply
 
Low energy intensity
 
Research and development
 
Equitable access
 
Transparency and participation in siting and decision-making
 
Education and information 
 
Preservation of land
 
Availability and quality of water
 
Minimal air pollution
 
Responding to climate change / adaptation
 
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions / mitigation
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SECTION 4
Did we miss any dimension that you consider important for the energy security of your country 
of residence in the next +ve years? Please enter below (or if we didn’t, then leave blank) 
___________________________________________
If you did provide an answer, when you think about energy security for your country 
of residence in the next +ve years, how important is this above dimension?
 Extremely Important
 Somewhat Important 
 Neither Important nor Unimportant 
 Somewhat Unimportant 
 Extremely Unimportant 
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